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ABSTRACT VariantsofavianinﬂuenzaH5N1virusthataretransmittedbytheairbornerouteamongferretshavebeenidentiﬁed.
TheNationalScienceAdvisoryBoardforBiosecurityhasadvisedagainstpublicationofthedetailsofthemethodsusedtoobtain
thesevirusesandtheaminoacidchangesthatleadtotransmissioninferrets.Thisdecisionisnotbasedonsoundscientiﬁcprin-
ciplesandriskssettingaprecedentthatwillmakeiteasiertoputinplacehighlyrestrictiveregulationsonscientiﬁcresearchand
publication.
T
wo laboratories recently identiﬁed variants of an avian inﬂu-
enza H5N1 virus strain that are transmitted by the airborne
route among ferrets (1). When these laboratories submitted their
work for publication, the National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity (NSABB) asked the authors to remove critical details
from the manuscripts to ensure that they cannot be used by biot-
errorists.Thisdecisioniswrong,notonlybecauseitrestsonweak
scientiﬁc grounds but also because it threatens to transform the
landscape of biological research by setting a precedent to restrict
research that can beneﬁt, not harm, humanity.
The goal of the experiments was to determine what makes the
inﬂuenza H5N1 virus transmissible. This virus strain is lethal in
birds, humans, and ferrets, but airborne transmission does not
readily occur among humans or ferrets. One group found that
after10serialferret-to-ferretpassages,avirusthatcouldspreadby
the aerial route among ferrets was obtained. The NSABB asked
that details on how the virus was isolated and the amino acid
changes leading to transmissibility be redacted from the manu-
script.
A major reason why the NSABB does not want this informa-
tion made public is that the virus is believed to be highly lethal in
humans. The chair of the NSABB notes that he “can’t think of
another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one.” The
reason for this view is exempliﬁed by a recent statement about
H5N1 in the New York Times: “In its natural form, it is known to
have infected only about 600 people since its discovery in 1997,
but it killed more than half of them” (2). We cannot say with any
certainty that the virus has infected only about 600 people. What
wedoknowisthatamongthe600seriouslyillindividualsinfected
with H5N1 inﬂuenza virus who are admitted to the hospital, over
half of them die.
The fatality rate of avian H5N1 inﬂuenza virus in humans is
determined by dividing the number of fatalities by the number of
infections. We do not know the last number—but there are hints
thatitcouldbequitelarge.InarecentstudyofruralThaivillagers,
serafrom800individualswerecollectedandanalyzedforantibod-
ies against several avian inﬂuenza viruses, including H5N1, by
hemagglutination inhibition and neutralization assays (3). The
resultsindicatethat73participants(9.1%)haveantibodiesagainst
one of two different H5N1 strains, suggesting that subclinical
avian inﬂuenza virus infections are frequent in Thailand. If 9% of
the rural Asian population has been infected with avian H5N1
inﬂuenza virus strains, it would dramatically change our view of
the pathogenicity of the virus. Extensive serological studies must
be done to determine the extent of human infection with avian
H5N1 inﬂuenza viruses.
Ferrets are not humans and cannot be used to determine
whether any inﬂuenza virus is a threat to humanity. Ferrets are a
good model for inﬂuenza—they display similar ﬂu-like symp-
toms, immune responses, and pathological alterations, such as
elevated temperature, weight loss, and histological changes (4). It
would be foolish to conclude that ferret inﬂuenza is the same as
humaninﬂuenzainallaspects.Notallinﬂuenzavirusstrainshave
the same virulence in humans and ferrets. An example is the 2009
pandemic H1N1 virus, which caused severe infections in some
ferret studies, but was relatively mild in humans (5). The fact that
an H5N1 virus is transmissible among ferrets does not mean that
itwillbeequallytransmissibleamonghumans.Theexperimentto
answer this question cannot be done.
Passageofvirusesinadifferenthostisonestrategyforreducing
viral virulence in humans. Many live, attenuated viral vaccines
havebeenproducedinthisway,includingvaccinesagainstyellow
fevervirusandpoliovirus(6,7).Thepossibilitythatpassageofthe
H5N1 virus in ferrets will attenuate its virulence in humans has
been ignored.
It is highly unlikely that the sequence of the ferret-adapted
H5N1 inﬂuenza virus would be used for bioterrorism, as its po-
tential for transmission and lethality in humans is unknown. Bio-
terrorists do not want to carry out an experiment; they want to
instill terror. Assuming that the H5N1 virus passaged in ferrets
couldstartapandemic,knowingtheaminoacidchangesrequired
for transmission in ferrets does not immediately enable construc-
tion of a biological weapon. The virus must be recovered from
cloned DNA, which requires ﬁnely honed skills in virology. A
good virologist would have already thought to serially passage the
H5N1virusinferrets,whichwouldbefasterthanreconstructinga
virus from the nucleotide sequence.
It seems simplistic to assume that laboratory-modiﬁed viruses
can cause extensive disease in humans. When humans genetically
modifyviruses,theygenerallydonotknowwhatthevirusneedsto
replicate efﬁciently, cause disease, and transmit among humans.
Consequently, they are likely to introduce changes that attenuate
pathogenesis in humans. In nature there is strong selection for
ﬁtnessandtransmission.Tothinkthatwecanduplicatetheenor-
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severe case of scientiﬁc hubris.
No one can guarantee that the ferret-passaged H5N1 virus
would not be lethal and transmissible in humans. However, the
samecouldbesaidaboutmanylaboratory-modiﬁedviruses,none
of which have attracted the attention of the NSABB or the press.
When we created the ﬁrst animal virus from cloned DNA in 1981
(8), there were no calls to redact the paper or prevent further
research,despitethetheoreticalpossibilitythatthisreagentmight
be used to produce more-virulent polioviruses. It was recognized
that cloned viral DNA could be used to make important advances
in our understanding of viral replication and pathogenesis.
Perhaps more troubling than the weak scientiﬁc basis for the
NSABB’s argument is the precedent set by withholding experi-
mental details from a scientiﬁc publication. Science has always
worked best when information is freely accessible. Unexpected
individuals from diverse areas often solve difﬁcult research prob-
lems. For decades, scientists have carried out experiments on
pathogens, and the results have been published in a way that al-
lowsotherscientiststorepeattheexperiments,verifyconclusions,
and expand on what is known. This cycle of publication, replica-
tion, and advancement has lead to most scientiﬁc and medical
advances of the past century and has saved millions of lives. To
suggest that studies of legitimate scientiﬁc merit should be pub-
lishedwithoutcompletemethodsanddataistoabandonasystem
that brought us to the modern age of medicine.
The decision by the NSABB to restrict publication of data on
H5N1inﬂuenzavirusesthataretransmissibleamongferretsisnot
rooted in sound scientiﬁc principles. Of greater concern is that it
riskssettingaprecedentthatwillmakeiteasierinthefuturetoput
in place highly restrictive regulations on scientiﬁc research and
publication. Fear has clouded the NSABB’s vision. We cannot al-
low fear to limit our ability to address medical problems.
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